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Abstract. While some recent frameworks on cognitive agents addressed the com-
bination of mental attitudes with deontic concepts, they commonly ignore the
representation of time. An exception is [1], which also manages some temporal
aspects with regard to both cognition and deontic provisions. We propose in this
paper a variant of the logic presented in [1] to deal in particular with temporal
intervals.
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1 Introduction
A common approach in the agent literature for programming cognitive agents in a BDI
(belief, desire, intention) framework is the use of rules to represent or manipulate the
agents mental attitudes. In addition to the three mental attitudes of beliefs, desires and
intentions, some works include deontic concepts to denote norms, commitments of so-
cial agents and social rationality [2,3,4,5,6]. However, these frameworks commonly
ignore the representation of time. An exception is [1], which adopts the rule-based ap-
proach of [7,8,9] and extends it to accommodate temporal aspects. Time is integrated
by pairing assertions with instants representing the time at which assertions hold and
by descriminating transient and persistent conclusions. Persistent conclusions persists
until some interrupting event occurs. Pairing assertions with instants is unsatisfactory
for at least two reasons: (i) some properties may end at a certain time not associated to
any explicit external event, (ii) we may like to represent rules where conditions have to
hold for certain temporal intervals. To remedy these issues, in this paper, we increase
the expressive power of the logic presented in [1] with temporal intervals. The frame-
work presented is based on Temporal Defeasible Logic (TDL), an umbrella expression
designating extensions of Defeasible Logic to capture time. Beside [1], TDL has proved
useful in modelling temporal aspects of normative reasoning, such as temporalised nor-
mative provisions [10]; in addition, the notion of temporal viewpoints -the temporal po-
sitions from which things are viewed- allows for a logical account of retroactive norms
and norm modifications [11].
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general conceptual
model behind the framework. Section 3 provides an outline of basic Defeasible Logic.
Section 4 describes a variant of modal TDL that formalises the model of cognition.
2 Time, norms and mental attitudes
Our model aims to give an account of some temporal aspects with regard to both mental
attitudes and deontic provisions. The starting point is the acknowledgement that, on
the one hand, recent works shows that reasoning about agents can be embedded in
frameworks based on non-monotonic logic, as the most interesting problems concern
cases where the agent’s mental attitudes are in conflict or when they are incompatible
with deontic provisions. On the other hand, in a temporal setting, non-monotonicity
can also be used to conclude that mental attitudes or deontic provisions persist up to
some future time unless there is a reason for it not to persist. One can thus argue that a
type of non-monotonicity concerns situations where mental attitudes are in conflict or
when they are incompatible with some deontic provisions, while another type of non-
monotonocity concerns temporal aspects. Our model is based on these two types of
non-monotonicity.
We adopt the model of [1] that extends the works of [7,8,9] with time. These later
works are themselves inspired by Bratman’s analysis of so-called policy-based atti-
tudes. In Bratman’s view intentions are used to choose partial plans for realisation of
a goal and have a close relation to mean-ends, whereas [7,8,9] intentions are related
not only to means-ends but also to their consequences. This notion is particularly rel-
evant with deontic and normative notions, for example if we want to say that an agent
is legally for A if the A is a side effect and if the agent did A with the intention to do
A. [7,8,9] extends this policy-based approach to other attitudes and motivational factors
as beliefs, intentions and obligations. An agent types correspond to the different ways
through which conflicts are detected and solved: a realistic agent thus corresponds to
a conflict-resolution type in which beliefs override all other factors, while other agent
types, such as simple minded, selfish or social ones adopt different orders of overruling.
[1] is on the same line of research of [7,8,9] and focus on some temporal aspects.
[1] is based on Bratman’s [12] which in his pursuit for a temporally extended rational
agency exposed a principle that can be roughly stated as follows:
– At t0, agent A consider the policy to adopt with respect a certain range of activities.
On this basis, agent A forms a general intention to ϕ in circumstances of type ψ .
– From t0 to t1, A retains this general intention.
– At t1, A notes that he/she is or will be in circumstance ψ at t2.
– Based on the previous steps, A forms the intention at t1 to ϕ at t2.
Given the temporal nature of Bratmans historical principle, and the idea that some
intentions can be retained from one moment to another, [1] accounts for two types of
temporal intentions: transient intentions which hold only for an instant of time, and
persistent intentions which an agent is going to retain unless some interrupting event
occurs that forces the agent to reconsider them. This event can be just a brute fact or it
can be a modification of the policy of the agent.
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The expressive power of [1] is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First some
properties may end at a certain time not associated to any explicit external event, for
example, an obligation or a norm in force may hold until some specific temporal refer-
ence. Secondly, we may like to represent rules where conditions have to hold for certain
temporal intervals. To remedy these issues, in this paper, we increase the expressive
power of the logic presented in [1] with temporal intervals.
Ordinarily, intervals are defined as sets of instants between two indicated instants.
Doing so, some difficulties may arise when we want to express that an event (for ex-
ample) occurs in an interval. This refers to the non-homogeneity or transient character
of events: if an event occurs in an interval conceived as a set of instants, then it would
also occur in the set of instants that defines it and this would conflict with the transient
characterisation of events. Hence, we deviate somewhat to the standart definition of in-
tervals as a set of instants, and define an interval as a pair of instants of the form [ti, t f ]
and usually denote them by T (plus eventual subscript). We identify two subtsets of
interval to differentiate intervals in which an associated property holds at any instant
between the boundaries and intervals in which an associated property holds at least one
instant between the boundaries. We shall call the firsts A-interval and the seconds B-
intervals. A-intervals are represented by expressions of the form [ti, t f ] and are usually
denoted by T while B-intervals are represented by expressions of the form [̂t f , t f ] and
denoted by T̂ . If the wide hat or the line over an interval is omitted then it is either an
A-interval or a B-interval.
Mental attitudes and normative provisions are related to temporal references and the
passage of time allows change of these elements. This is in accordance with the com-
monly accepted opinion that in a static system where nothing changes, the temporal
dimension does not provide more understanding. Our references are intervals and al-
lows us to temporalise literals and rules. In its simplest form, a temporal literal is an
expression of the form l:T where l is a literal and T is either an A-interval or a B-
interval. Intuitively, l:T means that l holds for all instants between the boundaries of T
while l:T̂ means that l holds for at least an instant between the boundaries of T̂ . For
example, adult(bob):[1973,max] means that Bob has legally reach adulthood in 1973.
Similarly, rules are temporalised by associating to it a time interval, and so a temporal
rule is an expression of the form:
(r: a1:T1 ... an:Tn ↪→ b:T ):Tr
The time labels allow us to deal formally with the different temporal dimensions of a
normative system. The temporal intervals labelling the antecedent of a rule, the con-
sequent of the rule and the overall rule are interpreted respectively as the intervals of
efficacy, applicability and time of force of the represented provision. These different
temporal dimensions are in line with the legal temporal model developed in [13]. and
that allows us to give an accurate account of temporal aspects of norms and therefore
to be consistent with legal principles. Note that the interval Tr labelling the entire rule
is an A-interval because the force of a provision is generally an homogeneous prop-
erty. Similarly, we constraint for the sake of simplicity the interval labelling the literal
in the head of the rule to be an A-interval. Intervals in the body can be A-intervals or
B-intervals. An example of a temporal rule is:
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(r: born(X):[t, t]→ ma jor(X):[t+18,max]):[1970,max]
This rule formalises the provision in force in 1970 and later that people legally reach
adulthood at 18. Consequently of the different temporal dimensions, a conclusion can
be associated to two temporal intervals. The first interval is the interval with which the
consequent of the rule is labelled while the second interval corresponds to the time of
force interval associated to the rule. We represent such temporalisation of conclusion
by concatenation of intervals by means of the symbol ’:’ and we call such concatenation
chain of viewpoints. For example. giving the rule r and the fact that Bob was born in
1960, then one can concludema jor(bob):[1978,max]:[1970,max], that is, Bob is legally
adult in 1978 (and later) from somebody reasoning in 1970 (and later).
Chain of viewpoints are of the upmost importance when one has to deal with the
retroactivity of norms. Retroactivity usually occurs when the effects of a rule r apply to
an interval [ti, t f ] which begins before the interval [t ′i , t ′f ] attached to the antecedent of
r, that is, ti < t ′i . Another case of retroactivity is when the consequence of a rule r′ in
force in [tri, tr f ] has as intervalof applicability [ti, t f ] and ti < tri. For an illustration of the
utility of chain of viewpoints with respects to retroactivity, consider the following rules:
(r1: Income> 90: ̂[1Mar06,1Jun06]⇒OBL ¬Tax:[1Jan06,1Jun06]):[15Jan06,1Jun06]
(r2: Income> 100: ̂[1Mar06,1Jun06]⇒OBL Tax:[1Jan06,1Jun06]):[1Apr06,1Jun06]
Rule r1 states that if the income of a person is in excess of ninety thousand between
the 1st March 2006 and the 1st June 2006 then she has not to pay the tax from 1st
January 2006 to 1st June 2006 with the policy being in force from 15 January 2006 to
1st June 2006. This means that the norm is part of the tax regulation from 15 January
2006 to 1st June 2006. The second rule, in force from 1st April 2006, establishes a tax
returns lodged after 1st April 2006. These two rules illustrate the concept of viewpoints.
Consider that the conditions in the antecedent of both rules hold, then one would derive
¬Tax:[1Jan06,1Jun06]:[15Jan06,1Jun06] but Tax:[1Jan06,1Jun06]:[1Apr06,1Jun06],
that is, if one reason from a point of view between the 15 January and the 1st April then
the tax is due while if one reason from a point of view between the 1st April and he 1st
June 2006 then no tax is due. Even though trivial cases of the phenomenon of retroac-
tivity are captured by rules such as r1 and r2, we should be able to detect retroactivity
also in other scenarios, where normative effects are in fact applied retroactively to some
conditions as a result of complex arguments that involve many rules. This problem is of
great importance not only because the designer of a normative systemmay have the goal
to state retroactive effects in more articulated scenarios, but also because she should be
able to check whether such effects are not obtained when certain regulations regard
matters for which retroactivity is not in general permitted. This is the case of criminal
law, where the principle -Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali- is valid.
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3 Defeasible Logic
Our system is formalised in an extension of Defeasible Logic. We provide in this section
a brief recall of it. Defeasible Logic [14,15,16] is based on a logic programming-like
language and it is a simple, efficient but flexible non-monotonic formalism capable of
dealing with many different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning. An argumentation
semantics exists [17] that makes its use possible in argumentation systems. DL has a
linear complexity [18] and also has several efficient implementations [19].
A Defeasible Logic theory is a structure D = (F,R,≺) where F is a finite set of
facts, R a finite set of rules, and ≺ a superiority relation on R. Facts are indisputable
statements, for example, “Bob is a minor,” formally written as minor(bob). Rules can
be strict, defeasible, or defeaters. Strict rules are rules in the classical sense; whenever
the premises are indisputable, so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Mi-
nors are persons,” formally written as r1: minor(X)→ person(X). Defeasible rules are
rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of a defeasible rule is
“Persons have legal capacity”; formally, r2: person(X)⇒ hasLegalCapacity(X). De-
featers are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusion. Their only use is to pre-
vent some conclusions by defeating some defeasible rules. An example of this kind of
rule is “Minors might not have legal capacity,” formally expressed as r3: minor(X);
¬hasLegalCapacity(X). The idea here is that even if we know that someone is a mi-
nor, this is not sufficient evidence for the conclusion that he or she does not have legal
capacity. The superiority relation between rules indicates the relative strength of each
rule. That is, stronger rules override the conclusions of weaker rules. For example, if
r3 r2, then the rule r3 overrides r2, and we can derive neither the conclusion that Bob
has legal capacity nor the conclusion that he does have legal capacity.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the set of
defeasible rules in R by Rd , the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , and the set
of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q. In the
following∼p denotes the complement of p, that is,∼p is ¬p if p is an atom, and ∼p is
q if p is ¬q. For a rule r we will use A(r) to indicate the body or antecedent of the rule
and C(r) for the head or consequent of the rule. A rule r consists of its antecedent A(r)
(written on the left; A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set), which is a finite set of
literals; an arrow; and its consequent C(r), which is a literal. In writing rules we omit
set notation for antecedents. Conclusions are tagged according to whether they have
been derived using defeasible rules or strict rules only. So, a conclusion of a theory D
is a tagged literal having one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D.
−∆q meaning that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
These different notions of provability come of use here because they enable the system
to label a suggestion as stronger or weaker depending on the kind of proof associated
with it. Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation
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is a finite sequence P = (P(1),...,P(n)) of tagged literals. Each tagged literal satisfies
some proof conditions. A proof condition corresponds to the inference rules that refer
to one of the four kinds of conclusions we have mentioned above. P(1..n) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length n. We state below the conditions for defeasibly
derivable conclusions:
If P(i+1) = +∂q then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) :+∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) :+∂a ∈ P(1..i) and t  s.
If P(i+1) =−∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) :+∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or t 6 s.
Informally, a defeasible derivation for a provable literal consists of three phases: First,
we propose an argument in favour of the literal we want to prove. In the simplest case,
this consists of an applicable rule for the conclusion (a rule is applicable if its antecedent
has already been proved). Second, we examine all counter-arguments (rules for the
opposite conclusion). Third, we rebut all the counter-arguments (the counter-argument
is weaker than the pro-argument) or we undercut them (some of the premises of the
counterargument are not provable).
4 Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic allows us to deal with defeasibility but as such does not provide any
mean to deal with modalities and temporal aspects. Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic
is an umbrella expression to designate possible extensions of Defeasible Logic to cap-
ture modalities and time. We present in this section an extension of [1] with intervals as
exposed in the model (see Section 2).
4.1 Modal Domain
The combination of mental attitudes and obligations are framed in extending Defeasible
Logic following the works of [7,8,9] and capture some basic facets of the modal notions
of knowledge, intentions, action and obligation.
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To extend Defeasible Logic with modal operators, new types of rules relative to
modal operator are introduced: arrows of the rules are labelled by the different modali-
ties we want to deal with. This solution leads to distinguishing different modes through
which the literals can be derived using rules. How such types of derivation are related
to the introduction of the corresponding modalised literals can be expressed as follows:
if X ∈ {KNOW, INT,ACT,OBL}, then
Γ Γ ⇒X ψ
Γ |∼Xψ MI
We make an exception when rules for knowledge are concerned. The reason for this
is that we assume that beliefs are conceived of as the knowledge the agent has of the
environment, and so they are used by the agent to make inferences about how the world
is: in this perspective, belief conclusions correspond to factual knowledge and do not
need to be modalised. But besides this exception, which can be removed if required,
schema MI captures the basic logical behaviour of our modal rules. Notice, also, that
actions are successful and intentional and so, when ACTψ is derived, this also implies
that ψ and INTψ are the case.
Other relations between modalities are captured by means of rule conversions and
conflicts.
The notion of rule conversion permits to use rules for a modality X as they were for
another modality Y . Suppose that a rule of a specific type is given and also suppose that
all the literals in the antecedent of a rule are provable in one and the same modality,
then it is arguable that the conclusion of the rule inherits the modality of the antecedent.
For example, consider the following formalisation of the Yale Shooting Problem.
load:[t, t], shoot:[t, t]⇒KNOW kill:[t, t]
This rule encodes the knowledge of an agent that knows that loading the gun with live
ammunitions, and then shooting will kill her friend. This example clearly shows that the
qualification of the conclusions depends on the modalities relative to the individual acts
“load” and “shoot”. In particular, if we obtain that the agent intends to load and to shoot
the gun (INT(load), INT(shoot)), then, since she knows that the consequence of these
actions is the death of her friend, she intends to kill him. However, if shooting was not
intended, then we have prima facie to say that killing, too, was not intentional. To define
the admitted conversions we introduce a binary relation Convert over the modalities of
the language. When we write Convert(KNOW,OBL) this means that a knowledge rule
r can be used to derive an obligation (of course, provided that all its antecedents are
derived as obligations): r can thus be converted into a rule for intention.
Beside conversions, Conflicts play an important role in the current context and it
is crucial to establish criteria for detecting and solving conflicts between the different
components which characterise the cognitive profiles of agent’s deliberation, and, above
all between mental states and normative provisions. Conflicts are detected and solved
by a similar strategy than basic Defeasible Logic, i.e, by following a pattern such that
(i) in a first phase an argument supporting the conclusion is advanced (ii) in the sec-
ond phase any possible attack are considers, and (iii) finally the counter-attack for each
attack. Accordingly we introduce a ternary relation Attack over the set of modalities
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that defines which types of rules are in conflict and which are the stronger ones. For
example, if we write Attack(OBL, INT,ACT) this means that, in the reasoning pattern
illustrated above, obligations in general override intentions, which in turn override ac-
tions.
The relation Attack is explicitly linked to that of agent type. Classically, agent types
are characterised by stating conflict resolution types in terms of orders of overruling
between rules [3,7,9,8]. In this perspective, agent types are meaningful within a non-
monotonic setting and are nothing but general strategies to detect and solve conflicts
between the different components of the cognitive profiles of agent’s deliberation. In [3]
24 possible types are identified while, in [8], based on a different framework, 20 com-
binations are proposed. Typically, rational agents are assumed to be at least realistic: a
realistic agent, in fact, is such that rules for knowledge override all other components.
If the realistic condition is abandoned, we may have various forms of wishful thinking.
Given the minimal assumption that a rational agent should be realistic, we may further
constrain agent’s deliberation in order not to violate obligations: a social agent type
requires that obligations are stronger than the other motivational components with the
exception of beliefs. Other agent types can be specified, for which see [7,8,9].
4.2 Temporal domain
Approaches in temporal reasoning are traditionally based on either instants, intervals
or both by representing one through the other. We represent intervals by means of in-
stants. Formally, we consider a totally ordered discrete set T of points of time termed
“instants” and over it the order relation > ⊆ T ×T . We usually denotes the variables
ranging over the members of T by t and its eventual subscripts, and the minimla unit
by u.
Ordinarily, intervals are defined as sets of instants between two indicated instants.
Here we deviate to this definition because of the non-homogeneity or transient character
of events: if an event occurs in an interval conceived as a set of instants, then it would
also occur in the set of instants that defines it and this would conflict with the transient
characterisation of events. Hence, we define an interval as a pair of instants. Formally,
an interval is a member of the set Inter = {[t1, t2] ∈ T ×T |t1 ≤ t2}. As can be noted,
this definition allows “punctual intervals” , i.e. intervals of the form [t, t]. Among the
set Inter, we identify two subtsets of interval to differentiate intervals in which an as-
sociated property holds at any instant between the boundaries and intervals in which
an associated property holds at least one instant between the boundaries. We shall call
the first A-interval and the seconds B-intervals. The set of A-intervals is denoted AInter
while the set of B-intervals is denoted BInter. We shall usually denote intervals by T ,
A-intervals by T and B-intervals by T̂ (plus eventual subscripts). We consider the func-
tions start() and end() that returns respectively the lower bound and upper bound of an
interval.
As explained in section 2, a conclusion can be associated to two temporal intervals
consequently of the different temporal dimensions. The first interval is the interval of
applicability with which the consequent of the rule is labelled while the second interval
corresponds to the time of force interval associated to the rule. Each interval can be
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assimilated to temporal Russian-dolled viewpoints from which conclusions are consid-
ered. We represent such temporalisation of conclusion by concatenation of intervals by
means of the symbol ’:’ and we call such concatenation chain of viewpoints. Chain of
viewpoints are denoted by V (plus eventual subscripts).
Temporal calculi are driven by operators over intervals. In the literature, one can
find many relations that hold between intervals. For example, [20] proposes an algebra
of intervals with thirteen mutually exclusive relations between two intervals. For our
purpose, we consider the set of relations to “subinterval” denoted v, “over” denoted
over, “meet” denoted meet, “start in” denoted si, “start before end” denoted sbe, and
“start before start” denoted sbs.
Definition 1. Let two intervals T ∈ Inter and T ′ ∈ Inter,
T v T ′ iff start(T ′)≤ start(T ) and end(T )≤ end(T ′).
over(T,T ′) iff start(T ′)≤ start(T )≤ end(T ′) or
start(T ′)≤ end(T )≤ end(T ′) or start(T )≤ start(T ′)≤ end(T ).
meet(T,T ′) iff end(T )+u= start(T ′).
si (T,T ′) iff start(T ′)≤ start(T )≤ end(T ′).
sbe (T,T ′) iff start(T )≤ end(T ′).
sbs (T,T ′) iff start(T )≤ start(T ′).
Note that T v T ′, si(T,T ′) or sbe(T,T ′) implies over(T,T ′), that T v T ′ implies
si(T,T ′) and that over(T,T ′) implies over(T ′,T ).
In order to lighten the paper, we may use the abbreviation consisting in placing
chain of viewpoints as arguments of the previous operators, such that for example,
– T v T ′ : T ′′ stands for T v T ′ and T v T ′′.
– T : T ′ v T ′′ : T ′′′ stands for T v T ′′ and T ′ v T ′′′.
– T : T ′ v T ′′ stands for T v T ′′ and T ′ v T ′′.
and similarly for other operators. Finally, we also use some abbreviations with regard
to the function start() and end(), such that for example,
– start(T ) = end(T ′′ : T ′′′) stands for start(T ) = end(T ′′) and start(T ) = end(T ′′′).
– start(T : T ′) = end(T ′′ : T ′′′) stands for start(T ) = end(T ′′) and start(T ′) = end(T ′′′).
– start(T : T ′) = end(T ′′) stands for start(T ) = end(T ′′) and start(T ′) = end(T ′′).
and similarly for others combinations of relation between start() and end().
10 R. Riveret, A. Rotolo, G. Governatori
4.3 The Language
A temporal defeasible agent theory consists of a discrete totally ordered set of instants
of time, a set of facts or indisputable statements, four sets of rules for knowledge,
intentions, intentional actions, and obligations, and a superiority relation > among
rules saying when a single rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For
X ∈ {KNOW, INT,ACT,OBL}, a temporal strict rule is an expression of the form
(φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ):Tr such that whenever the premises φ1 : T̂r, . . . ,φn : T̂r are indis-
putable so is the conclusion ψ : Tr. A defeasible rule is an expression of the form
(φ1, . . . ,φn ⇒X ψ):Tr whose conclusion can be defeated by contrary evidence. An ex-
pression (φ1, . . . ,φn ;X ψ):Tr is a defeater used to defeat some defeasible rules by
producing evidence to the contrary. It is worth noting that modalised literals can occur
only in the antecedent of rules: the reason of this is that the rules are used to derive
modalised conclusions while we do not conceptually need to iterate modalities. This
limitation makes the system more manageable.
Definition 2 (Language). Let T a discrete totally ordered set of instants of time, Prop
be a set of propositional atoms, Mod= {KNOW, INT,ACT,OBL} be the set of modal
operators, and Lab be a set of labels. The sets below are the smallest sets closed under
the following rules:
Literals
Lit= Prop∪{¬p|p ∈ Prop}
Modal Literals
ModLit= {Xl,¬Xl|l ∈ Lit,X ∈ {INT,ACT,OBL}};
Intervals
Inter= {T = [t1, t2]|t1, t2 ∈T , t1≤ t2};
A-Intervals
AInter= {T = [t1, t2]|t1, t2 ∈T , t1≤ t2};
B-Intervals
BInter= {T̂ = [̂t1, t2]|t1, t2 ∈T , t1≤ t2};
Chain of Viewpoints
ChainView= {V = T1,V ′ = T1 : T2|T1,T2 ∈ AInter∪BInter};
Temporal Literals
TempLit= {l : T |l ∈ Lit,T ∈ AInter∪BInter};
Multi-Temporal Literals
MTempLit= {l :V |l ∈ Lit,V ∈ ChainView};
Temporal Modal literals
TempModLit= {Xl : T |Xl ∈ModLit,T ∈ AInter∪BInter};
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Multi-Temporal Modal literals
MTempModLit= {Xl :V |Xl ∈ModLit,V ∈ ChainView};
Temporal Rules
Rules = {(r : φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ) : T |
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ TempLit∪TempModLit,X ∈Mod,ψ ∈ TempLit,T ∈ AInter}
Ruled = {(r : φ1, . . . ,φn ⇒X ψ) : T |
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ TempLit∪TempModLit,X ∈Mod,ψ ∈ TempLit,T ∈ AInter}
Ruledft = {(r : φ1, . . . ,φn;X ψ) : T |
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ TempLit∪TempModLit,X ∈Mod,ψ ∈ TempLit,T ∈ AInter}
Rule= Rules∪Ruled ∪Ruledft
We use some abbreviations: A(r) denotes the set {φ1, . . . ,φn} of antecedents of the
rule r, and C(r) to denote the consequent ψ of the rule r. We use also superscript for
mental attitude, subscript for type of rule, and Rule[φ ] for rules whose consequent is
φ . If one does not refer to the content of the rule, a temporal rule can be written as r:T
where r is the label of the rule and T is a temporal interval. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes
the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then
∼q is p);
Definition 3 (Defeasible Agent Theory). A defeasible agent theory is a structure
D= (T ,F,RKNOW,RINT,RACT,ROBL,>,C ,A )
where
– T a discrete totally ordered set of instants of time;
– F ⊆ TempLit∪TempModLit is a finite set of facts;
– RKNOW ⊆ RuleKNOW, RINT ⊆ RuleINT, RACT ⊆ RuleACT, ROBL ⊆ RuleOBL are four
finite sets of rules such that each rule has a unique label;
– >⊆ RKNOW∪INT∪ACT∪OBL × RKNOW∪INT∪ACT∪OBL is an acyclic superiority rela-
tion.
– C ⊆ {Convert(X ,Y )|X ,Y ∈Mod} is a set of conversions.
– V ⊆ {Attack(X ,Y,Z)|X ,Y,Z ∈Mod} is a set of attack relation.
4.4 Proof Theory
The formalism we have introduced allows us to temporalise rules, thus we have to
admit the possibility that rules are not only given but can be proved to hold for certain
span of time. Accordingly we have to give conditions that allow us to derive rules
instead of literals. A conclusion of a theory D is a tagged temporal literal or rule having
one of the following forms:
+∆γ:V meaning that γ:V is definitely provable in D.
−∆γ:V meaning that γ:V is not definitely provable in D.
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+∂γ:V meaning that γ:V is defeasible provable in D.
−∂γ:V meaning that γ:V is not defeasible provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation
is a finite sequence P = (P(1), ..,P(n)) of tagged modal literals or rules temporalised
by chain of viewpoints. Each tagged temporal modal literal or rule satisfies some proof
conditions, which correspond to inference rules for the four kinds of conclusions we
have mentioned above. In order to lighten the presentation of the proof conditions, we
present separately the condition for applicability of rules:
If Convert(Y,X) and r:Tr is ∆ -applicable in the proof condition for ±∆X then
(1) +∆r:Tr ∈ P(1..i), and either
(2) r:Tr ∈ RX ,
(2.1) ∀α:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr),
(2.1.1) +∆KNOWα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), or +∆KNOWα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.1.2) +∆ACTα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), or +∆ACTα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i),
(2.2) ∀α:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),
(2.2.1) +∆KNOWα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), or +∆KNOWα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.2.2) +∆ACTα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), or +∆ACTα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), and
(2.3) ∀Zα:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr),+∆Zα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), or +∆Zα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), and
(2.4) ∀Zα:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),+∆Zα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), or +∆Zα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(3) r:Tr ∈ RY ,
(3.1) ∀α:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr), +∆Xα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), or +∆Xα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), and
(3.2) ∀α:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),+∆Xα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), or +∆Xα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i).
The conditions for a rule r to be ∂ -applicable are the same as those for ∆ -
applicable, but where we replace ∆ with ∂ .
If Convert(Y,X) and r:Tr is ∆ -discarded in the proof condition for ±∆X then
(1) −∆r:Tr ∈ P(1..i), or either
(2) r:Tr ∈ RX ,
(2.1) ∃α:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr),
(2.1.1) −∆KNOWα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), and −∆KNOWα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), and
(2.1.2) −∆ACTα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), and −∆ACTα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.2) ∃α:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),
(2.2.1) −∆KNOWα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), and −∆KNOWα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), and
(2.2.2) −∆ACTα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), and −∆ACTα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.3) ∃Zα:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr),−∆Zα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), and −∆Zα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.4) ∃Zα:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),−∆Zα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), and −∆Zα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(3) r:Tr ∈ RY ,
(3.1) ∃α:Tα ∈ A(r:Tr), −∆Xα : Tα ∈ P(1..i), and −∆Xα : Tα :T̂r ∈ P(1..i), or
(3.2) ∃α:T̂α ∈ A(r:Tr),−∆Xα : T̂α ∈ P(1..i), and −∆Xα : T̂α :T̂r ∈ P(1..i).
The conditions for a rule r:Tr to be ∂ -discarded are the same as those for ∆ -
discarded, but where we replace ∆ with ∂ .
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We are now ready to define the proof theory that is, the inference conditions to
derive tagged conclusions from a given theory D. We begin with the proof conditions to
determine whether a rule is a definite conclusion of a theory D. A temporal rule r:T is
definitely provable (+∆ ) if (1) there exists a rule r:Tr in the set of rule such that T v Tr,
or (2) r is defined in two intervals Tr1 and Tr2 that make up T . Formally:
If P(i+1) = +∆r:T then
(1) ∃Tr,v Tr,r:Tr ∈ R,T , or
(2) ∃Tr1,∃Tr2, meets(Tr1,Tr2), start(Tr1) = start(T ), end(Tr2) = end(T ),
r:Tr1 ∈ R and r:Tr2 ∈ R.
A rule r is not definitely provable at interval T if (1) there is not such rule in the set rules
defined in a larger interval (2) r is not defined in any intervals Tr1 and Tr2 that make up
T . Formally:
If P(i+1) =−∆r:T then
(1) ∀Tr,v Tr,r:Tr /∈ R,T , and
(2) ∀Tr1,∀Tr2, meets(Tr1,Tr2), start(Tr1) = start(T ), end(Tr2) = end(T ),
r:Tr1 /∈ R or r:Tr2 /∈ R.
A temporal rule r:T̂ is definitely provable (+∆ ) if there exists a rule r:Tr in the set
of rule such that over(T̂ ,Tr). Formally:
If P(i+1) = +∆r:T̂ then ∃Tr,over(T̂ ,Tr),r:Tr ∈ R.
If P(i+1) =−∆r:T̂ then ∀Tr,over(T̂ ,Tr),r:Tr /∈ R.
We can now move to definite conclusion of temporal literals. We begin with literals
temporalised by a chain of viewpoints V , i.e. temporalised by T or T :T ′.
If P(i+1) = +∆Xγ:V then
(1) ∃Tγ ,V v Tγ ,Xγ:Tγ ∈ F , or
(2) if X = KNOW then ∃Tγ ,V v Tγ ,γ:Tγ ∈ F , or
(3) if X = INT then ∃Vγ ,V vVγ ,+∆ACTγ:Vγ , or
(4) ∃r:Tr ∈ Rs[γ : Tγ ], V v Tγ :Tr, r:Tr is ∆ -applicable, or
(5) ∃Vγ1,∃Vγ2, meets(Vγ1,Vγ2), start(Vγ1) = start(V ), end(Vγ2) = end(V̂ )
+∆Xγ:Vγ1 ∈ P(1..i) and +∆Xγ:Vγ2 ∈ P(1..i).
To prove that a modal literal temporalised by a chain of viewpoints is not definitely
provable we have to show that any attempt to give a definite proof fails.
If P(i+1) =−∆Xγ:V then
(1) ∀Tγ ,V v Tγ ,Xγ:Tγ /∈ F , and
(2) if X = KNOW then ∀Tγ ,V v Tγ ,γ:Tγ /∈ F , and
(3) if X = INT then ∀Vγ ,V vVγ ,−∆ACTγ:Vγ , and
(4) ∀r:Tr ∈ Rs[γ : Tγ ], V v Tγ :Tr, r:Tr is ∆ -discarded, and
(5) ∀Vγ1,∀Vγ2, meets(Vγ1,Vγ2), start(Vγ1) = start(V ), end(Vγ2) = end(V̂ )
−∆Xγ:Vγ1 ∈ P(1..i) or −∆Xγ:Vγ2 ∈ P(1..i).
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The conditions for a temporal literal γ:V̂ (i.e. γ:T̂ or γ:T̂ :T̂ ′) to be not definitely
provable with modality X (±∆X ) are formally expressed below.
If P(i+1) = +∆Xγ:V̂ then ∃V̂γ ,over(V̂ ,Vγ),+∆Xγ:Vγ .
If P(i+1) =−∆Xγ:V̂ then ∀V̂γ ,over(V̂ ,Vγ),−∆Xγ:Vγ .
The definition of ∆ -applicable, and ∆ -discarded of rules contains the definite
(un)provability of modal literals temporalised by chain of viewpoint of the tpye T :T̂r.
We cater for such cases in the two next proof conditions.
If P(i+1) = +∆Xγ:T :T̂r then
∃Tγ1,∃Tr1,T v Tγ1, over(T̂r,Tr1),+∆Xγ:Tγ1:Tr1 ∈P(1..i).
If P(i+1) =−∆Xγ:T :T̂r then
∀Tγ1,∀Tr1,T v Tγ1, over(T̂r,Tr1),−∆Xγ:Tγ1:Tr1 ∈P(1..i).
We now turn our attention to defeasible derivations, that is, derivations giving a
temporal assertion γ:V as a defeasible conclusion of a theory D. We begin with the
proof conditions to determine whether a rule is a defeasible conclusion.
If P(i+1) = +∂ r:T then +∆r:T ∈ P(1..i)
If P(i+1) = +∂ r:T̂ then +∆r:T̂ ∈ P(1..i).
Defeasible provability (+∂ ) for temporal literals consists of three phases. In the
first phase, we put forward a supported reason for the temporal assertion that we want
to prove. Then in the second phase, we consider all possible attacks against the desired
conclusion. Finally in the last phase, we have to counter-attack the attacks considered
in the second phase.
If P(i+1) = +∂Xγ:V and Convert(Y,X) and Attack(W,Z,X) then
(1) +∆Xγ:V ∈ P(1..i), or
(2) −∆X∼γ:V̂ ∈ P(1..i), and
(2.1) if X = INT then ∃Vγ ,V vVγ , +∂ACTγ:Vγ , or
(2.2) ∃r:Tr ∈ RX∪Ysd [γ:Tγ ], V v Tγ :Tr, r:Tr is ∂ -applicable,
(2.3) ∀s:Ts ∈ RW∪Z∪X∪Y [∼γ:T∼γ ], si(T∼γ :Ts,Tγ :Tr), sbe(T∼γ :Ts, V ),
(2.3.1) s:Ts is ∂ -discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃w:Tw ∈ RK [γ:Twγ ], V v Twγ :Tw,
(2.3.2.1) w:Tw is +∂ -applicable, and either
(2.3.2.2) s:Ts ∈ RX∪Y ,
(2.3.2.2.1) w:Tw ∈ RW∪Z , or
(2.3.2.2.2) w:Tw ∈ RX∪Y , w:Tw  s:Ts, or
(2.3.2.3) s:Ts ∈ RZ ,
(2.3.2.3.1) w:Tw ∈ RW , or
(2.3.2.3.2) w:Tw ∈ RZ , w:Tw  s:Ts, or
(2.3.2.4) s:Ts ∈ RW , w:Tw ∈ RW , w:Tw  s:Ts, or
(3) ∃Vγ1,∃Vγ2, meets(Vγ1,Vγ2), start(Vγ1) = start(V ), end(Vγ2) = end(V̂ )
+∂Xγ:Vγ1 ∈ P(1..i) and +∂Xγ:Vγ2 ∈ P(1..i).
Normative Systems and Cognitive Agents in Defeasible Logic 15
If P(i+1) =−∂Xγ:V and Convert(Y,X) and Attack(W,Z,X) then
(1) −∆Xγ:V ∈ P(1..i), and
(2) +∆X∼γ:V̂ ∈ P(1..i), or
(2.1) if X = INT then ∀Vγ ,V vVγ , −∂ACTγ:Vγ , and
¿(2.2) ∀r:Tr ∈ RX∪Ysd [γ:Tγ ], V v Tγ :Tr, r:Tr is ∂ -applicable,
(2.3) ∃s:Ts ∈ RW∪Z∪X∪Y [∼γ:T∼γ ], si(T∼γ :Ts,Tγ :Tr), sbe(T∼γ :Ts, V ),
(2.3.1) s:Ts is ∂ -applicable, and
(2.3.2) ∀w:Tw ∈ R[γ:Twγ ], T v Twγ :Tw, either
(2.3.2.1) w:Tw is ∂ -discarded, or
(2.3.2.2) s:Ts ∈ RX∪Y ,
(2.3.2.2.1) w:Tw /∈ RW∪Z , and
(2.3.2.2.2) w:Tw ∈ RX∪Y , w:Tw 6 s:Ts, and
(2.3.2.3) s:Ts ∈ RZ
(2.3.2.3.1) w:Tw /∈ RW , and
(2.3.2.3.2) w:Tw ∈ RZ , w:Tw 6 s:Ts, and
(2.3.2.4) s:Ts ∈ RW , w:Tw ∈ RW , w:Tw 6 s:Ts, and
(3) ∀Vγ1,∀Vγ2, meets(Vγ1,Vγ2), start(Vγ1) = start(V ), end(Vγ2) = end(V̂ )
−∂Xγ:Vγ1 ∈ P(1..i) and −∂Xγ:Vγ2 ∈ P(1..i)
Let us illustrate the proof condition of the defeasible provability of Xγ:V . We have
two cases: 1) We show that Xγ:V is already definitely provable; or 2) we need to argue
using the defeasible part of D. In this second case, to prove Xγ:V defeasibly we must
show that X∼γ:V̂ is not definitely provable (2). We require then there must be a strict
or defeasible rule r:Tr ∈ RX∪Y which can be applied and with head γ:Tγ such that
V v Tγ :Tr (2.1). But now we need to consider possible attacks, i.e., reasoning chains
in support of ∼γ:V , that is, any rule s:Ts ∈ RW∪Z∪X∪Y which has head ∼γ:T∼γ such
that si(T∼γ :Ts,Tγ :Tr), and sbe(T∼γ :Ts, V ). Note that here we consider defeaters, too,
whereas they could not be used to support the conclusion Xγ:V ; this is in line with the
motivation of defeaters given earlier. These attacking rules s:Ts have to be discarded
(2.3.1), or must be counterattacked by a stronger rule w:Tw which has a head γ:Twγ
such that V is contained in Twγ :Tw (2.3.2). Finally, we have to cater for the case where
Xγ is defeasible provable on Vγ1 and Vγ2 that make up V (3).
The defeasible proof for a temporal literal to hold in some instants of a chain of
viewpoints V̂ is less demanding since it is sufficient to prove it for at least an instant in
V .
If P(i+1) = +∂Xγ:V̂ and Convert(Y,X) and Attack(W,Z,X) then
∃Vγ ,over(V̂ ,Vγ),+∂Xγ:Vγ ∈P(1..i).
If P(i+1) =−∂Xγ:V̂ and Convert(Y,X) and Attack(W,Z,X) then
∀Vγ ,over(V̂ ,Vγ),−∂Xγ:Vγ ∈P(1..i).
Similarly to definite conclusions, the definition of ∂ -applicable, and ∂ -discarded
of rules contains the defeasible (un)provability of modal literals temporalised by a chain
of viewpoints of the type T :T̂r. We cater for such cases by these two finals proof condi-
tions.
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If P(i+1) = +∂Xγ:T :T̂r then
∃Tγ1,∃Tr1,T v Tγ1, over(T̂r,Tr1),+∂Xγ:Tγ1:Tr1 ∈P(1..i).
If P(i+1) =−∂Xγ:T :T̂r then
∀Tγ1,∀Tr1,T v Tγ1, over(T̂r,Tr1),−∂Xγ:Tγ1:Tr1 ∈P(1..i).
Proof conditions for modal literals temporalised by chain of viewpoints of the type
T̂ :Tr are nor presented here but follows similar schema.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we extended the logic presented in [1] with temporal intervals in order to
express its expressive power. Doing so, we have extended the programming cognitive
agents approach with modal literals and rules temporalised with intervals. This makes
the resulting logic more expressive and more suitable for the task at hand. In addition
we have considered the notion of viewpoint. The deliberation of an agent based on a
policy depends not only on the environment but also on the rules in force in the policy
at the time of deliberation and at the time when the plan resulting from the deliberation
will be executed. These two aspects are neglected in the literature on agent planning.
An aspect we did not consider here is how revise theories in the same way as complex
modification of normative codes [11].
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